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ABSTRACT
Fraudulent claim detection is one of the greatest challenges the
insurance industry faces. Alibaba’s return-freight insurance, provid-
ing return-shipping postage compensations over product return on
the e-commerce platform, receives thousands of potentially fraudu-
lent claims everyday. Such deliberate abuse of the insurance policy
could lead to heavy financial losses. In order to detect and prevent
fraudulent insurance claims, we developed a novel data-driven pro-
cedure to identify groups of organized fraudsters, one of the major
contributions to financial losses, by learning network information.
In this paper, we introduce a device-sharing network among
claimants, followed by developing an automated solution for fraud
detection based on graph learning algorithms, to separate fraud-
sters from regular customers and uncover groups of organized
fraudsters. This solution applied at Alibaba achieves more than 80%
precision while covering 44% more suspicious accounts compared
with a previously deployed rule-based classifier after human expert
investigations. Our approach can easily and effectively generalizes
to other types of insurance.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social and professional topics → Financial crime; • Com-
puting methodologies→ Neural networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
What if you bought a shirt but found significant color difference be-
tween the on-screen product and the real-life product? What if you
discovered a less expensive alternative after purchasing a laptop?
Returning the item is likely to be the first choice when shopping
online. However, returning an unused item can raise lots of disputes
between buyers and sellers because of the ambiguities over which
party should take responsibilities. Surprisingly, most disputes fo-
cus not on whether the undamaged item should be returned, but
on who should pay for return shipping costs. It takes enormous
efforts and a great deal of time to resolve such disputes, especially
at Alibaba1, a platform with millions of sellers and diverse return
policies. To resolve disputes and protect buyers’ right of regret, a
new form of insurance has been created.
Return-freight insurance, designed to pay buyers the return ship-
ping costs, has retained billions of dollars in revenue. However, the
loss caused by fraudulent claims is non-trivial. Fraudsters receive
shipping discounts from their partner express companies and file
claims with the regular shipping price. According to the estimates
of insurance experts at Alibaba, thousands of potentially fraudulent
claims go undiscovered with the previous rule-based fraud detec-
tion system. Among these false claims, the most destructive ones
are claimed by groups of organized fraudsters. The need for a more
powerful and more flexible fraud detection solution is significant.
1.1 Our Fraud Detection Problem
Fraud detection in insurance claims can be viewed as a supervised
binary classification problem. We classify insurance accounts into
two categories: fraudulent and regular. Labels of accounts in the
training set are obtained from a formerly deployed rule-based sys-
tem with some, but not sufficient, confidence. We aim to discover
1https://www.alibaba.com
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many more fraudulent accounts than the rule-based system while
retaining high precision.
Networks provide straightforward information for describing
and modeling complex relations among colluders (collaborating
fraudsters). We build a device-sharing graph, a transaction graph,
and a friendship graph to illustrate such relations, and apply two
graph learning approaches, one based on node2vec [3] and another
based on GeniePath [4], to mine such information. We conduct
extensive experiments to compare these approaches and describe
our complete fraud detection solution which implements the device-
sharing graph and our workflow deployed at Alibaba.
1.2 Challenges in Fraud Detection
The challenges we face that hinder the performance of fraud de-
tection systems include concept drift, label uncertainty, and
excessive human effort.
Concept drift in fraud detection refers to the phenomenon that
new types of fraud evolve over time and get more and more unpre-
dictable. It’s mainly caused by the use of non-stationary features
in fraud detection systems. Non-stationary behaviors, such as the
number of claims made in the past month, can be easily affected
when fraudsters change their tactics. We address this problem by
adding more stationary data. Relations between collaborating fraud-
sters are naturally stationary, e.g. device-sharing graphs.
Label uncertainty arises because of the usage of rule-generated
labels. The formerly deployed rule-based fraud detection system
outputs a risk tag for each account, say ‘high risk’ and ‘no observ-
able risk’. We are confident at ‘high risk’ accounts, but it is unclear
that whether the ‘no observable risk’ accounts are at risk or not. In
other words, the labels consist of a small amount of true positive
labels and a large amount of unknown labels. To build training
labels, we randomly undersample samples from the ‘no observable
risk’ class, which is explained in the Data Preparation section.
Excessive human effort comes from the labeling tasks and
evaluation tasks in traditional insurance fraud detection settings.
As we focuses on automated risk control that with negligible human
effort, our approach requires no human interventions besides a
periodical evaluation (weekly or monthly) conducted by insurance
professionals that samples and examines the classification results
for loss estimation.
2 RELATEDWORK
Insurance fraud detection approaches can be generally divided into
supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and a mixture of both.
Popular supervised algorithms, such as Bayesian networks and
decision trees have been applied or combined in [5, 6]. Unsupervised
approaches, such as cluster analysis and outlier detection have
also been applied [1, 7]. Hybrids of supervised and unsupervised
algorithms have been studied, and unsupervised approaches have
been used to segment insurance data into clusters for supervised
approaches in [2].
Our two approaches fall under supervised learning and hybrids
of both, respectively. Our approaches differ, as they represent data
with graphs, which are one of the most natural representations of
data and allow for complex analysis without simplification of data.
Table 1: Graphs for Comparison
Graph |V| |E| nodes edges
device-sharing 3 M 6 M account / UMID device usage
transaction 2 M 2 M account fund exchange
friendship 8 M 11 M account friendship
3 GRAPH CONSTRUCTION
To address concept drift as well as to uncover organized fraudsters,
we resort to the power of graphs that help reveal strong relations of
accounts. In this section, we construct and compare different types
of graphs including a device-sharing graph, a transaction graph,
and a friendship graph. We explain which graphs fit our needs, and
apply the device-sharing graph in our final fraud detection solution.
The following properties of graphs can help separate fraudulent
from regular:
(1) distance aggregation: closer nodes have similar labels;
(2) structural differentiation: structures of organized fraudsters
are different from structures of regular accounts.
3.1 Three Graphs
The device-sharing graph reveals the relation of accounts sharing
a device. A vertex is either a device (User Machine ID, UMID2) or
an account. Edges only exist between a device vertex and a UMID
vertex, indicating log-in activities in the history. The transaction
graph shows fund exchange relations between accounts. A vertex
is an account, and an edge indicates the existence of established
transactions between accounts. The friendship graph is built upon
friendship at Alipay, a product of Ant Financial with social net-
working features. We preprocess these graphs to remove singleton
accounts.
3.2 Graph Comparison
Typical subgraphs of organized fraudsters and regular users are
visualized in Figure 1. Colluders are organized in ways that are
contrasting with regular customers’ as exhibited by the device-
sharing graph and the friendship graph. Accounts with high risk
tend to share the same group of devices and transfer funds with
each other. Such patterns imply that a group of fraudsters works
together to conduct frauds and split profits. The transaction graph
fails to show such properties.
Besides, a proper graph needs to distinguish fraudulent accounts
from regular accounts. Non-stationary features revealing online
behavior patterns are selected as account node features. We assume
a group of fraudsters share similar behaviors. As graph neural net-
work methods aggregate information from the neighborhood, a
graph constructed with closer nodes sharing similar labels makes
the classification problem easier. We measure the ability to ag-
gregate fraudulent accounts with node distribution with respect
to the distance from fraudulent nodes. The distribution is shown
in Figure 2. Fraudulent accounts gather around each other in the
device-sharing graph, implying that it is more appropriate for the
account classification task.
2Device fingerprints to uniquely identify devices.
(a) Device-sharing: colluders (b) Device-sharing: regular
(c) Transaction: colluders (d) Transaction: regular
(e) Friendship: colluders (f) Friendship: regular
Figure 1: Visualization for typical colluders and regular
users in device-sharing graph, transaction graph, and friend-
ship graph.
4 GRAPH LEARNING APPROACH
Node embedding approaches and graph neural network approaches
are two major techniques to understand graph information. Here
we present an inductive graph neural network algorithm for the
insurance fraud detection problem. A node embedding approach is
briefly introduced in Section 5.2.
4.1 Graph Neural Networks (GNNs)
GNNs are a set of deep learning architectures that aggregate in-
formation from nodes’ neighbors using neural networks. A deeper
layer in neural networks aggregates more distant neighbors, and
the t-th layer embedding of node u is
h
(t )
u = σ (Wt · AGG(h(t−1)v ,∀v ∈ N (u) ∪ {u}))
where the initial embedding h(0)u = xu ∈ RP is the account feature,
h
(t )
u ∈ RK denotes the intermediate embedding at t-th layer, σ is
the activation non-linear function, and AGG(·) is an aggregation
function over neighbors that differs in GNN algorithms [4].
The GNN approach we use is based on GeniePath [4], that simply
stacks adaptive path layers to aggregate each node’s neighborhood
based on breadth and depth exploration in the graph. For breadth
exploration, it iteratively aggregates neighbors for T times:
h
(t+1)
u = tanh (Wt
∑
v ∈N(u)∪{u }
softmaxv (µ⊤tanh(Wsh(t )u +Wdh
(t )
v )) · h(t )v )
This breadth-search function learns the importance of neighbors
with pairwise account feature patterns. Given those hidden units
(h(0)u ,h
(1)
u , ...,h
(T )
u ) at various depths, a depth-search function hu =
LSTM(h(0)u ,h
(1)
u , ...,h
(T )
u ;ϕ) is added to further extract and filter the
signals. The resulting embeddings hu ’s are fed to the final softmax
or sigmoid layers for downstream fraud account classification tasks.
4.2 Optimization with Label Uncertainty
Given the final embedding hu ’s, we have to optimize parameters
θ B {Wt ,Ws ,Wd , µ,ϕ}. The labels used for classification are based
on ‘risk tags’ generated by a rule-based account risk indicator. We
treat ‘high risk’ accounts as fraudulent, and ‘no observable risk’
accounts as regular.
However, the dataset suffers from label uncertainty - the rule-
based risk indicator is much more confident about ‘high risk’ ac-
counts being fraudulent than about ‘no observable risk’ accounts
being regular. To address this problem, ‘regular’ accounts are sam-
pled randomly to reduce the uncertainty of classifying a ‘no observ-
able risk’ account as fraudulent, as shown in the modified objective
function:
L(θ ) = min
θ
(
∑
v ∈Vfraudulent
ℓ(GeniePath(xv ;θ ), fraudulent)
+
∑
v ′∈sample(Vregular)
ℓ(GeniePath(xv ′ ;θ ), regular))
Our goal is to minimize the losses caused by wrong classifications.
The chance of punishment of a false positive is controlled by the
downsampling rate in terms of the new objective function.
5 EXPERIMENTS
We compare three approaches for fraud detection, two of which use
graph learning algorithms, while the baseline uses account-level
features only.
5.1 Data Preparation
Each graph we constructed contains accounts that have filed a claim
within a 30-day period. Device UMIDs used by these accounts in
the past 40 days are also added as graph nodes. Edges are estab-
lished between account nodes and UMID nodes with login relations.
Isolated subgraphs, which contain only one account node, are re-
moved to reduce computational effort. For initial features of each
account node, we collect 50 features (e.g., number of claims sub-
mitted over a month, duration as a customer, etc.), derived from
insurance claim history, shipping history, and shopping history.
The resulting graph contains around three million nodes and six
million edges (see Table 1).
5.2 Comparison Methods
We evaluate our GNN-based graph learning approach against a
gradient boosted decision tree (GBDT) classifier, and against a
node embedding approach. For all approaches, we calculate the
probability of being at risk for each account in the test dataset, and
then compare the F1 score.
5.2.1 The GBDT approach. The GBDT classifier uses account fea-
tures as inputs without any graph structural information.
5.2.2 The Node Embedding Approach. node2vec [3] assigns a low-
dimensional vector to represent a graph node. It is unsupervised
and only uses graph structural information. Node2vec-generated
embeddings are concatenated with account features and fed to
downstream classification tasks using a GBDT [8].
(a) Device-sharing (b) Transaction (c) Friendship
Figure 2: Average number of N-hop neighbors around fraudulent accounts.
Table 2: Results based on Rule-based Labels.
GBDT Node Embedding GNNs
F1 0.547 0.535 0.623
DE 1.47 1.44 1.44
Figure 3:Model comparisonwith the Precision-Recall curve.
5.3 Experimental Setups
We set the same hyperparameters for all GBDT modules: 500 trees,
max tree depth of 5, data sampling rate of 0.6, feature sampling rate
of 0.7, and a learning rate of 0.009. We randomly sample 25% of ‘no
observable risk’ accounts as negative samples.
5.4 Results and Discussion
Our results, summarized in Table 2 and plotted in Figure 3, show
that the GNNs-based approach outperforms the others. Detection
expansion (DE), defined as F P+T P+FNT P+FN , indicates the ability to de-
tect more fraudulent accounts. All of our approaches raise the
coverage of fraudulent account detection by more than 40% while
GNNs-based approach has higher precision and recall at most time.
The GBDT approach is slightly better than the node embedding
one. This result implies that embeddings learned solely from graph
information are not as good as account features. We find out the
most valuable features come from shopping history - if a user has
spent a lot over the past year, we are confident he/she is not a
fraudster.
6 APPLICATION
The fraudulent claim detection system collects accounts that have
filed a claim over the past months and classifies them in a batch
mode that updates daily. The classification result is evaluatedmonthly
by an insurance professional, who randomly samples and examines
300 accounts out of the reported fraudulent accounts. Daily human
intervention is not necessary and human effort is enormously saved.
The most recent reports show that we have achieved precision of
over 80% while covering 44% more suspicious accounts compared
with the former rule-based classifier. The estimated savings are
over 10 thousand dollars per month.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a device-sharing graph and graph learning-
based approaches to address the fraud detection problem. It is the
first paper in the literature that introduces a real-world insurance
fraud detection system utilizing the strong expressiveness of graphs.
Graphs have proved their power in multiple online insurance areas.
We illustrate three types of graphs and show their advantages
in separating fraudulent and regular using graph neural networks.
We propose optimization algorithms for GNNs with only positive
and unlabeled data. With proper graphs, features, and algorithms,
we have achieved precision of over 80% and covered 44% more
suspicious accounts in return-freight insurance fraud detection
with automated solutions.
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